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Abstract
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) form a new wireless networking paradigm with unique 
characteristics that give them appreciated interest in a vast range of applications. However, 
many challenges are facing MANETs including security, routing, transmission range, and 
dynamically changing topology with high node mobility. Security is considered as the main 
obstacle for the widespread adoption of MANET applications. Black hole attack is a type of 
DoS attack that can disrupt the services of the network layer. It has the worst malicious impact 
on network performance as the number of malicious nodes increases. Several mechanisms 
and protocols have been proposed to detect and mitigate its effects using different strategies. 
However, many of these solutions impose more overhead and increase the average end-to-
end delay. This chapter proposes an enhanced and modified protocol called “Enhanced RID-
AODV,” based on a preceding mechanism: RID-AODV. The proposed enhancement is based 
on creating dynamic blacklists for each node in the network. Each node, according to criteria, 
depends on the number of mismatches of hash values of received packets as compared with 
some threshold values, and the sudden change in the round-trip time (RTT) can decide to 
add or remove other nodes to or from its blacklist. The threshold is a function of mobility 
(variable threshold) to cancel the effect of normal link failure. Enhanced RID-AODV was 
implemented in ns-2 simulator and compared with three previous solutions for mitigating 
multiple black hole attacks in terms of performance metrics. The results show an increase in 
throughput and packet delivery ratio and a decrease in end-to-end delay and overhead ratio.
Keywords: enhanced RID-AODV, MANET security, multiple black hole attacks, 
network layer attack
1. Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a network of mobile nodes that are able to move 
arbitrarily and are connected by wireless links. It is a self-configuring network that does 
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not require any preexistent infrastructure such as centralized management or base stations. 
If two mobile nodes are within each other transmission range, then they can communicate 
with each other directly; otherwise, the nodes in between have to forward the packet for 
them. Hence, mobile nodes are not only functioning as hosts but they are also functioning as 
routers [1, 2].
Because MANETs are infrastructure-less networks with no centralized administration, they 
can be self-deployed in a short time. The easy deployment of nodes, self-organizing nature, 
and freedom of mobility make MANETs suitable for a broad range of applications. They can 
be useful in disaster recovery and emergency operations where there is not enough time or 
resources to install and configure an infrastructure. They are also used in other applications, 
for example, in military services, maritime communications, vehicle networks, casual meet-
ings, campus networks, robot networks, etc., [3].
On the other hand, MANETs are vulnerable to various attacks at all layers. So, much research 
has been conducted on providing security services for MANETs, because security is the main 
obstacle for the widespread adoption of MANET applications. MANETs are vulnerable in 
their functionality: intruders can compromise the operation of the network by attacking at 
any of the physical, MAC, or network layers. The network layer, especially the routing pro-
tocol, is vulnerable because of the use of cooperative routing algorithms, the limited compu-
tational ability of nodes, the exhaustible node batteries, the lack of clearly defined physical 
network boundary, and the transient nature of services in the network. Standard information 
security measures such as encryption and authentication do not provide complete protec-
tion; thus intrusion detection and prevention (IDP) mechanisms are widely used to secure 
MANETs [4].
Attacks in MANET can be divided, according to the criteria that whether they disrupt the 
operation of a routing protocol or not, into two classes: passive attacks and active attacks. In 
passive attacks, the attacker attempts to discover valuable information but does not disrupt 
the operation of the routing protocol. Active attacks, however, involve actions like modifica-
tion and deletion of exchanging data to absorb packets destined to other nodes to the attacker 
for analyzing or disabling the network [5].
Black hole attack is a type of active attack that exploits the route reply message (RREP) feature 
of the routing protocol. A malicious node sends RREP messages without checking its routing 
table for a fresh route to a destination. A RREP message from a malicious node is the first to 
arrive at a source node. Hence, a source node updates its routing table for the new route to 
the particular destination node and discards any other RREP messages from other neighbor-
ing nodes or even from the actual destination node. Once a source node saves a route, it starts 
sending buffered data packets to a malicious node hoping they will be forwarded to a desti-
nation node. Nevertheless, a malicious node (performing a black hole attack) drops all data 
packets rather than forwarding them [6].
So, the black hole attack is a DoS attack that disrupts the services of routing layer by exploit-
ing the route discovery process of AODV. According to many research studies that focus on 
studying the effects of malicious attacks on network performance, the simulation results show 
that the black hole attack is more dangerous than other attacks in the network layer [7].
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Several mechanisms and protocols have been proposed to detect and mitigate its effect using 
different strategies. However, many of these solutions impose more overhead and increase 
the average end-to-end delay. In this paper, we propose a modified and enhanced protocol 
that aims to detect and mitigate the effects of multiple black hole attacks in MANETs. The 
proposed solution, “Enhanced RID-AODV,” was implemented in ns-2 simulator and com-
pared with three previous solutions for mitigating multiple black hole attacks in terms of 
performance metrics. The results show an increase in throughput and packet delivery ratio 
and a decrease in end-to-end delay and overhead ratio.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some details about the black 
hole attack; Section 3 provides the related work in detection and mitigation of black hole 
attack. The proposed protocol is introduced in Section 4; the simulation and network environ-
ment is described in Sections 5 and 6, the analysis and the results are discussed. Finally, the 
conclusion is presented in Section 7.
2. Black hole attack in MANETs
Routing protocols in mobile ad hoc networks by their nature are distributed routing proto-
cols with the assumption that all nodes in the network will cooperate truly and participate 
honestly. However, the existence of malicious nodes makes this assumption not true. Such 
nodes may drop the packets, if they are not the destination, without forwarding them or 
may disrupt the routing discovery and maintenance processes resulting in abnormal network 
operation that affects the performance of the network and may cause denial of service [8].
A black hole attack is a kind of denial of service where a malicious node can attract all packets 
by falsely claiming a fresh route to the destination and then absorb them (drop all packets) 
without forwarding them to the destination [9].
In reactive routing protocols such as AODV, the destination sequence number (dest_seq) is 
used to describe the freshness of the route. A higher value of dest_seq means a fresher route. 
On receiving a RREQ, an intruder can advertise itself as having the fresher route by send-
ing a route reply (RREP) packet with a new dest_seq number larger than the current dest_seq 
Figure 1. Black hole attack illustration.
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number. In this way the intruder becomes part of the route to that destination [10]. Figure 1 
illustrates the black hole attack where nodes S and D are the source and destination, respec-
tively, and node B is the black hole.
A black hole has two properties: First, the node exploits the ad hoc routing protocol to adver-
tise itself as having a valid route to a destination, even though the route is spurious with the 
intention of intercepting packets. Second, the node consumes the intercepted packets. In an 
ad hoc network that uses the AODV protocol, a black hole node absorbs the network traffic 
and drops all packets [9].
3. Materials and methods
Several mechanisms and protocols using different strategies have been proposed to pro-
tect MANETs against black hole attacks. In addition, some research studies have focused 
on studying the effect of malicious nodes on network performance without providing any 
solutions. Kanthe et al. studied the effect of malicious attacks in mobile ad hoc networks 
including black hole attack, packet drop attack, and gray hole attack on AODV protocol 
under different performance metrics: throughput, packet drop rate, and end-to-end delay. 
It was found that the black hole attack is more dangerous than other attacks mentioned in 
this paper [7].
Aad et al. provided a quantitative study of the performance impact and scalability of DoS 
attacks in ad hoc networks. They have also considered the black hole attack, as its impact in 
ad hoc networks. The authors considered the following as critical performance measures for 
a system under attack: total system throughput and probability of interception in addition to 
the system fairness measures and the mean number of hops for a received packet. The simula-
tion results for the impact of black hole node showed that the system has high fairness index 
with no black hole in the network [11].
Dinesh Mishra et al. analyzed the effects of black hole attack in mobile ad hoc network using 
AODV and DSR routing protocols. The authors considered the throughput as the main per-
formance measure. Simulation results, by NS-2 simulator, showed that a higher data packet 
loss when using DSR as compared to AODV. The observation and results showed that DSR 
data loss is around 55–60% in the presence of black hole attack, while 45–50% in the AODV 
routing. AODV protocol provides better performance than the DSR in the presence of black 
holes with minimal additional delay and overhead [12].
Sonja Buchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec proposed a robust reputation system for mis-
behavior detection in mobile ad hoc networks. Nodes have a monitor for observations, 
reputation records for first-hand and trusted second-hand observations about routing and 
forwarding behavior of other nodes, trust records to control trust given to received warnings, 
and a path manager to adapt their behavior according to reputation and to take action against 
misbehaved nodes. Nodes monitor their neighbors and change the reputation accordingly. 
When the reputation rating is bad, they take action in routing and forwarding. The routes 
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containing the misbehaved node are either reranked or deleted from the path cache. In addi-
tion, once a node has detected a misbehaved node, it informs other nodes by sending an 
ALARM message [13].
Deng et al. proposed a method to solve the black hole problem. This method is to disable the 
ability of an intermediate node to reply in a RREP message, so all reply messages should be 
sent out only by the destination node. This method increases the routing delay, especially for 
a large network. Besides, a malicious node can take advantage by fabricating a reply message 
claiming it was sent from the destination node. Another solution was proposed in this paper 
that depends on using one more route to the intermediate node that replays the RREQ mes-
sage to check whether the route from the intermediate node to the destination node exists or 
not. If it does not exist, the reply message from the intermediate node is discarded and an 
alarm message to the network is sent out. Using this method, the black hole problem was 
avoided, and further malicious behavior was also prevented. This method cannot prevent 
multiple black hole attacks [14].
Seungjoon Lee et al. proposed a method to avoid black hole attack based on introducing 
additional route confirmation messages: route confirmation request (CREQ) and route confir-
mation reply (CREP). In the proposed method, the intermediate node requests its next hop to 
send a confirmation message to the source. After receiving both route reply and confirmation 
message, the source determines the validity of path according to its policy. Simulation results 
show remarkable improvement in 30% higher delivery ratio. Its drawback is that it cannot 
detect multiple black hole attacks and the control messages have been increased [15].
Kurosawa et al. proposed an anomaly detection scheme for black hole nodes using dynamic 
training method in which the training data is updated at regular time intervals. They consid-
ered the destination sequence number in order to detect this attack. In normal state, sequence 
number changes depending on its traffic conditions, and the destination sequence number 
tends to rise monotonically when the number of connections increases. However, during the 
attack, the sequence number is increased largely. A statistical method is applied for detec-
tion of black hole that is based on the difference between destination sequence numbers of 
received RREPs. The simulation results of this method showed significant effectiveness in 
detecting the black hole attack as compared with conventional scheme. Through the simula-
tion, our method shows significant effectiveness in detecting the black hole attack [16].
The solution proposed by Kumar and Selvakumar, focuses on the requirement of a source 
node to wait unless there is arrival of RREP packet from more than two nodes. When it 
receives multiple RREPs, the source node checks that there is any share hops or not. The 
source node will consider the route safe if it finds the share hops. Its drawback is the introduc-
tion of time delay it has to wait for the arrival of multiple RREPs before it judges the authen-
tication of node [17].
A lightweight routing protocol IDSAODV was proposed by Dokurer et al. in [18] as a solu-
tion for black hole attack problem in MANETs. The authors manually analyzed the output file 
obtained from simulation and found out very soon after the first RREP from the destination 
node a second RREP arrived at the source node. Through simulation, they found out that the 
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first RREP was from the black hole node and the second RREP was from the intended desti-
nation. At this point, for future simulations, they assumed that the first RREP would always 
be from black hole node and modified the AODV protocol to ignore the first RREP and send 
using second RREP route. A RREP caching mechanism to count the second RREP message 
was added to aodv.cc file in NS-2 [18].
The simulation results demonstrate that IDSAODV improved the PDR in a MANET with 
a single black hole node, thus proving the successful implementation of the route caching 
mechanism [18].
Many of the proposed solutions that make the route establishment process longer while the 
nodes are moving are facing from the link failure problem. Shree and Ogwu in [6] addressed 
this issue by getting advantage of the reverse AODV (RAODV) routing protocol proposed by 
Kim et al. in [19]. RAODV discovers route using reverse route discovery procedure where 
the destination node sends reverse-route request (R-RREQ) messages to its neighbors to find 
a valid route to the source node after receiving RREQ from source node. Their simulation 
results of RAODV show that it does improve the performance of AODV in metrics such as 
packet delivery ratio (PDR), end-to-end delay, and energy consumption [6, 19].
Although RAODV has not been designed to prevent black hole attacks and it was developed 
with the aim of solving path failure problem, Shree and Ogwu proposed in [6] to use it in 
mitigating the effects of black hole attacks in ad hoc networks. Therefore, they proposed RID-
AODV protocol that combines RAODV (proposed in [19]) and IDSAODV (proposed in [18]) 
to withstand multiple black hole attacks in client-based WMNs [6].
4. The proposed protocol: enhanced RID-AODV
Routing is an essential operation in all network types, and it has special importance in ad hoc 
networks, because in such networks, nodes are operating not only as hosts, but they are also 
operating as routers. Therefore, any breakthrough in the routing process has a direct impact 
to the performance of the whole network. This is the reason why routing is targeted in many 
kinds of attacks in MANETs especially black hole attack.
The proposed protocol, “Enhanced RID-AODV,” is a modification and enhancement of the 
RID-AODV protocol proposed in [6]. RID-AODV protocol was proposed as combination of 
previous two protocols, namely, IDSAODV (which is proposed in [18]) and RAODV (pro-
posed in [19]) as mentioned in the previous section. Therefore, we got all the advantages of 
the preceding protocols in mitigating the bad impact of the existence of malicious black hole 
nodes in the ad hoc network. Thus, better results in terms of performance metrics [20].
The detection of the malicious nodes and mitigation their effects can be achieved by creating 
and maintaining dynamic blacklist in each node according to some criteria. Then each non-
malicious node will prevent sending or forwarding to the neighboring nodes that exist in its 
own blacklist either in the forward or reverse path. In other words, each node will not use 
blacklisted nodes as intermediate nodes. Dynamic blacklist means that each node adds and 
Recent Advances in Cryptography and Network Security30
removes nodes to or from its blacklist automatically according to specific criteria as will be 
explained in this section.
The criteria for each node to add another node’s address in its blacklist is the repetitive mis-
match in the hash value of the receiving frames (layer 2 frame) from the same neighboring 
node. So, each node keeps a counter for each other node that receives a frame from the neigh-
boring nodes. If there is a mismatch between the received hash value and the calculated value, 
the corresponding counter for the sending (or forwarding) node will be incremented. When 
the counter reaches some threshold value ( malPcktThreshold ), then the corresponding neighboring 
node will be blacklisted [21].
Each node keeps small number of counters. If node  n 
i
 has  p neighboring nodes ( p is ⊆ of all nodes) 
and  n 
i
 is receiving from  q nodes ( qis ⊆ ofp ), then  n 
i
 will keep only  q counters for this purpose.
In addition, we can get another advantage of the nature of the reverse route discovery proce-
dure in RAODV to create full path (bidirectional) integrity check implemented in hop-by-hop basis to 
detect any modifications on the traversing packets and to detect the causing nodes.
To distinguish between hash value mismatch that may occur as a result of normal link fail-
ure, which is from the nature of MANETs due to mobility of nodes that communicate wire-
lessly or from the existence of malicious nodes, the threshold value  malPcktThreshold should 
be considered as a function of mobility (variable threshold). If the node is moving with 
relatively high speed, the mismatch of hash values is most likely due to normal link fail-
ure, and so the threshold should be high. On the other hand, if there are many hash value 
mismatches while the node is moving slowly, there is most likely a malicious node. So, the 
value of  malPcktThreshold is directly proportional to the node speed, and it was implemented 
by using Eq. (1):
  malPcktThreshold = NodeSpeed + C (1)
where  C is the threshold value when the node speed is zero.
The malicious node may not act as a black hole all the time; it may become benign for some 
period of time; then it may (or may not) resume its malicious activities. So, when a node adds 
another node’s address to its blacklist, the blacklisted node will not stay in its blacklist for-
ever. However, it will be blacklisted for a previously specified period of time. So, when a node 
is added to another node’s blacklist, not only the address of the blacklist is added but also the 
expiry time for that node to be released from that blacklist. The blacklisted node expiry time 
is computed using Eq. (2):
  blkListedNodeExpTime =  CURRENT 
TIME
 + blockingPeriod (2)
Each time the node wants to send (or forward) a packet to a neighboring node, it will check if 
it is blacklisted, and if so it will also check the expiry time for that node. If it’s expired, it will 
be removed from the blacklist of that node, and its corresponding counter and expiry timer 
will be reset. Because of that it is a dynamic blacklist.
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When a node wants to send (or forward) a packet, in either the forward path or reverse path, 
it will check the routing table to decide what is the next hop. Then it will check if the next hop 
is blacklisted or not; if it’s blacklisted, it will check the blacklist expiry time. If the next hop 
node is still blacklisted, then the node will remove that node from its neighbor list and run 
the handle link failure procedure. Then the node will try to send (or forward) the packet by 
using another path.
As a result, we can get a secure path that avoids the black hole malicious nodes during routing 
packet as shown in Figure 2.
The criterion for the reverse path is the round-trip time ( RTT ).  RTT is the length of time it 
takes the RREQ to be sent (or forwarded) plus the length of time it takes for the R-RREQ 
to be received by the node. As we assumed that all the nodes are trusted, we can measure 
RTT in the normal behavior and use it as a reference. Any change in this value indicates 
that the reply was not from the original destination, so this value can be used to detect the 
malicious node.
The node will first measure round-trip time ( RTT ). Then it will calculate the average hop-to-
hop time ( T 
h−h ) using Eq. (3):
  T 
h−h  =  RTT __________ 2 ∗ hopcount (3)
Now, the New  RTT ( RTT 
next
 ) should satisfy the following condition:
  RTT −   T h−h  ____
2
  <  RTT 
next
  < RTT +   T h−h  ____
2
 (4)
Figure 2. Secure routing path.
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The sequence diagram of the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol is shown in Figure 3.  RTT values 
are shown in normal behavior and in malicious behavior.
Figure 3. Sequence diagram for the Enhanced RID-AODV.
Figure 4. Pseudocode for the proposed protocol: how the node decides to add other nodes in its blacklist.
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Figure 6. Pseudocode for the proposed protocol: how the node behaves when sending or forwarding a packet.
Figure 7. Flowchart of the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol.
Figure 5. Pseudocode for the proposed protocol: how the node decides to remove a node from its blacklist.
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In our protocol we used one-way hashing function on the level of packets in the routing dis-
covery control messages. The purpose of using a hash function is to produce a “fingerprint” 
of the message. This fingerprint will be used for route request (RREQ) packet authentication 
and integrity check in each hop while traversing from source node to the destination node 
and for reverse route request (R-RREQ) from destination to source, resulting in a two-way 
(bidirectional) control packet authentication and integrity check. To implement the Enhanced 
RID-AODV protocol, a new field was added in the route request (RREQ) and reverse route 
request (R-RREQ).
The pseudocodes for the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol are presented in Figures 4–6.
The flowchart for the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol is illustrated in Figure 7.
5. Simulation and network environment
Network Simulator version 2 (NS-2) was adopted in this research study because it is one 
of the most popular network simulators that are appropriate to simulate the wireless net-
works. Ns-2 is an open-source discrete event-driven simulator that is written in C++ language. 
During the simulation the packet header (aodv_packet.h file) of the AODV route request and 
route reply (changed to route reverse request) is modified to hold the hash value ( Hash 
Val
 ) 
with packet. In addition to that, the files aodv.h and aodv.cc were modified to implement the 
Enhanced RID-AODV protocol together with previous protocols. Also, files/common/node.h 
and /common/node.cc have been modified to hold the  q counters and the blacklists inside each 
node. Simulation was carried out by referring to many resources including but not limited to 
references [22–24].
The simulation area is a square field of 1000 × 1000 m with fixed sender and receiver nodes 
that communicate using intermediate mobile nodes, which are moving randomly during 
simulation time (these random movements were generated using setdest tool), and the inter-
mediate nodes are sending random traffic pattern among each other (created using cbrgen.
tcl command). The sender and receiver were placed in points (200,200) and (800,800), respec-
tively. So they are out of the transmission range of each other, and all traffic between them is 
through the moving intermediate nodes. The parameter considered in this simulation is given 
in Table 1.
In this research, the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol together with four preceding protocols 
was implemented and simulated with the same environment parameters to be able to make 
a comparison among them. That includes the genuine AODV protocol with simulation of 
black hole malicious nodes, the IDSAODV protocol, RAODV protocol, RID-AODV protocol, 
and our proposed protocol which is Enhanced RID-AODV. For each protocol many scenarios 
were generated to simulate the existence of different numbers of malicious nodes in order to 
study the effect of multiple malicious nodes on network performance and the effectiveness of 
each protocol to compare among these protocols; we made as many combinations of nodes to 
act as malicious nodes, and then we computed the average of the results.




Four performance metrics were considered and computed as the average of many cases in 
all scenarios of multiple malicious nodes for all the protocols in this research. Four separate 
scripts were generated to compute these performance metrics using awk command:
• Throughput: the amount of data transferred over the period of time expressed in kilobits 
per second (kbps). Throughput has been calculated using Eq. (5):
  Throughput =  ∑ ReceivedDataPackets  __________________ 
SimulationTime
  (5)
• Packet delivery ratio (PDR): the percentage ratio of the total number of data packets re-
ceived by the destination node to the number of data packets sent by the source node as 
in Eq. (6):
  PDR =  ∑ NumberofReceivedDataPackets   __________________________ ∑ NumberofSentDataPackets ∗ 100 (6)
• Average end-to-end delay: the average delay between the sending of the data packet by 
the source node and its receipt at the destination node. This includes all the delays caused 
during route acquisition, buffering and processing at intermediate nodes, retransmission 
delays at the MAC layer, etc. The average end-to-end delay was computed using Eq. (7):
Parameter Value
Simulator ns-2
Routing protocol AODV, IDSAODV, R-AODV, RID-AODV, Enhanced RID-AODV
Simulation time 100 sec
Simulation area 1000 × 1000 m
Number of nodes 40
Number of malicious nodes 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Sender node Fixed at point (200,200)
Receiver node Fixed at point (800,800)
Intermediate nodes Moving randomly
Maximum speed of mobile nodes 40 m/s
Data rate 50 Kb/s
Pause time 0 sec
Transport type UDP, CBR
Data packet size Default
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11
Table 1. Parameters used in simulation.
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 ( ReceiveTimeofP i −  SentTimeofP i ) 
   ____________________________ 
NumberofReceivedPacket
 (7)
where i is the packet index and n the last packet in the message.
• Overhead ratio: the ratio of the total number of control packets sent at the routing level and 
the total number of packets sent from the source node as in Eq. (8):
  OverheadRatio = 1 −  NumberofDataPacketsSentatRTR   __________________________
NumberofAllPacketsSentatRTR
 (8)
6. Results and analysis
Figure 8 shows the results of the throughput for the case of the existence of black hole 
nodes (as the number of black hole nodes increases up to seven malicious nodes) for the 
genuine AODV and the four solutions: IDSAODV, R-AODV, RIS-AODV, and Enhanced 
RID-AODV.
Figure 8 shows the effects of increasing the number of malicious nodes in the network on 
the throughput are clear. One black hole in the network has a huge impact in decreasing the 
throughput, and few numbers of malicious nodes are able to prevent all traffic from reach-
ing the destination. Previous protocols provide sole improvements on the throughput; how-
ever, the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol provides more improvement to throughput that takes 
advantages from its enhancements and from the preceding protocols in stability and robust-
ness in avoiding multiple black hole nodes.
The packet delivery ratio (PDR) was computed; the results are shown in Figure 9.
Figure 8. Throughput vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols.
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The impact of malicious nodes in dropping the packets to reduce the received packets is 
obvious. Only one black hole node in the network is able to reduce the PDR to around 10% 
of the original PDR. We can notice the improvements provided by the different protocols in 
the research.
One of the major improvements of the Enhanced RID-AODV is decreasing the average end-
to-end delay. The results are illustrated in Figure 10.
The previous protocols had an impact in increasing the average end-to-end delay with the 
increase in the throughput and PDR. However, in the Enhanced RID-AODV, due to the use of 
blacklists, the nodes choose the optimized path. As a result the average end-to-end delay has 
decreased as compared to RID-AODV. This is an important improvement because time is a 
significant factor in ad hoc networks.
Figure 9. PDR vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols.
Figure 10. Average end-to-end delay vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols.
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Also the overhead ratio has been improved by the proposed protocol as shown in Figure 11.
The previous protocols impose more overhead. The increase of the overhead ratio is mainly 
due to R-RREQ control message. However, in Enhanced RID-AODV, and as a result of apply-
ing blacklists in the intermediate nodes, the overhead ratio has decreased.
7. Conclusion
Several mechanisms and protocols have been proposed to detect and mitigate the effects of 
multiple black hole attack using different strategies. However, many of these solutions impose 
more overhead and increase the average end-to-end delay. In this paper a new mechanism, 
called “Enhanced RID-AODV,” was proposed to detect and mitigate the effects of multiple 
black hole attacks in MANETs aiming to increase the throughput and PDR while decreasing 
the average end-to-end delay and overhead. It is an enhanced and modified version of a pre-
viously proposed mechanism called RID-AODV. RID-AODV is a combination of two other 
protocols: RAODV and IDSAODV.
According to the simulation results, Enhanced RID-AODV provides higher throughput and 
higher packet delivery ratio than its preceding version. Also, the dynamic blacklists provide 
positive effects in decreasing the overhead ratio and the end-to-end delay.
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Figure 11. Overhead ratio vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols.
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